Over the past eight years that we have given our course, each time the class has faced a major crisis or regulatory development unfolding in real time, making our course particularly lively and relevant. One year our course was confronted with the developing Eurozone crisis. Four years ago the boom in fintech and the LendingClub crisis was one of the most relevant developments discussed in class. During the last couple of years dynamics shifted towards deregulation and increasingly forceful initiatives to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. This year, we can expect more reversals in the post-crisis regulatory framework being implemented. As we begin this year, financial crises in Turkey and Argentina seem on the horizon and the threat of a global trade war will result in further financial instability. In short a special quality of this course is the application of the material and general principles to crisis-related problems and regulatory developments unfolding in real time.
Using a mix of economic history, finance, and law-related materials we plan to address the following themes: 1) Are financial crises foreseeable or unforeseeable? Do they arise from processes internal to the financial sector (such as the "leverage cycle") or from external events, such as changes in the political landscape that change the terms of financial globalization?
2) Are there more or less stable structures for the financial system? The financial system aims to match suppliers of capital (savers) and users of capital (business users and consumers). From a stability point of view, is such financial intermediation better done through financial institutions or through markets?
3) Is there an optimum size for financial institutions? Should certain financial market activities be combined (for efficiency and diversification) or separated? 4) Are we better off with rigorous schemes of crisis avoidance or efficient resolution mechanisms, if long periods of financial stability inevitably lead to increased leverage, asset price inflation and a resulting steeper crash? Perhaps we are better off by focusing attention on mopping up smaller, more frequent crashes? 5) Do recurrent crises flow from the political constraints on optimum regulation? There are two facets to this question. First is the desire of incumbent political leaders to promote reelection chances by producing economic growth or greater home ownership, which favors expansionary credit policies. Second is the firm-level competition within the financial sector to protect and expand rents. Both of these elements bear on regulatory outcomes.
6) The financial environment is driven by the interplay of legislation, regulation, governance and monetary policy. To what extent can independent central bank intervention through monetary policy correct for legislative or regulatory debility? 7) Do the goals of differently tasked regulators conflict in a way that may undermine systemic stability? How does the disclosure focus of securities regulators fit with the safety and soundness goals of financial regulators, as evidenced for example in Bank of America and Merrill merger or the crisis-era manipulation of Libor? 8) International coordination and its limits: do the concessions made to obtain sufficient national buy-in to achieve a widespread international regime (necessary to avoid free-riding) undermine the effectiveness of the international regulatory architecture? One example where this issue has arisen prominently in recent years is the zero risk-weighting on all OECD sovereign debt under the Basel accords. 9) Last but not least, what are the economic, social, and political costs of financial crises? Eleven years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers has the U.S. finally turned the corner?
Course Requirements: You will be asked to write a final take-home exam, which will count towards 80% of the final grade. The other 20% will be based on class participation. You are expected to have read the starred readings in advance.
Week 1: Introduction
Financial crises are common throughout history including recent history. What accounts for their frequency? Do they arise from causes internal to the financial system, or do they result from external events, unexpected and not foreseeable? What are the social, economic and political consequences of financial crises? 
S. Savings and Loans Crisis
At least 3 separate factors were at work in the S&L crisis: (i) an exogenous shock (here: high inflation (attributable at least in part to oil price shocks) and high short term interest rates); (ii) regulation and regulatory distortion that made the financial system vulnerable to the particular shock; and (iii) the politics of forbearance that exacerbated the crisis. Are these elements common to all crises? Are financial markets and financial intermediaries fundamentally unstable? Is greater financial stability achieved by matching investments and investors through financial institutions or through markets? (The readings below are more technical than other readings on the syllabus. Students are not expected to master all the details of the analysis in these papers. Reading the introductions of these articles should be sufficient. A key article is Diamond & Dybvig. 
Weeks 6-7: The Political Economy of Financial Crisis
The focus of the next 2 ½ weeks will be the interaction of political economy and regulation in financial regulation. Political economy plays a critical role in four respects: first, as shaping government behavior that creates the pre-conditions for a financial crisis; second, in limiting enforcement under existing laws that could constrain excesses of market actors; third, in shaping the reform proposals in the legislative phase; fourth, in shaping the implementation of the proposals in subsequent regulation. We will consider this interaction generally and then turn to two specific depression era reforms, deposit insurance and Glass-Steagall. Along the way we will also consider the "fitness" of the adopted reforms for their intended purpose. 
